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Assessing the Prevalence of Middle Eastern Extreme Ideologies
among some Iranians
Abstract
This article investigates the prevalence of the extreme Middle Eastern ideologies among
Iranians. Using the Assessment and Treatment of Radicalization Scale (ATRS) on a sample
of Iranian participants, the authors collected from 138 Iranian Muslims. The authors
compared this data with data previously collected from other parts of the world that
included Atheists, Christians, and Muslims. The ATRS is a scale for measuring
quantitatively Middle Eastern extremist ideologies on risk areas as reported in the
literature. Similar, to previous results, the current results indicated that Iranian Muslims
scored significantly higher than the sampled Christians and Atheists. However, the score of
total ATRS and its subscale for Muslims of Iran was significantly less than from Muslims in
other parts of the world.
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Introduction
Extremism and violent acts motivated by religious beliefs are not a new
phenomenon, and are not restricted to one religion or one region of the
world. However, religious fundamentalism has increasingly become a
main concern for people throughout the world over the recent decades.
Religious dogmatism is considered a serious threat to human peace
following the events in the United States on September 11, 2001.1 Ideology
plays a crucial role in the terrorists’ target selection, supplying terrorists
with an initial motive for action and providing a prism through which they
view events and the actions of others.2 Hence, many researchers are now
more motivated to investigate the potential factors which intensifies
tensions in Middle East tensions. They concluded that fundamentalist
ideological teachings in the Middle East are one of the most influential
factors evoking violent thoughts and actions, and that extremists try to
spread their own ideologies through the politicization of religion.3
Religious extremists are willing to murder because they embrace
theologies that sanction violence in the service of God.4
Several scholars reported on the magnitude and extent of ideologically
Based Terrorism post 9/11. For example, in 2006, it was estimated that
over 1,000 terrorist organizations were active in more than one hundred
countries.5 From 2001 to 2007 terrorists have attempted over thirty
attacks against European Union countries.6 From 2002 to 2005, an
average of four terrorist attacks occurred annually in different countries,
killing an average of 214 people each year.7 In Canada, there were forty
groups listed as terrorist entities in 2008.8 Further, it is estimated that
since 9/11, terrorists having Middle Eastern religious ideologies are
responsible for killing over 26,000 and wounding 50,000 in attacks in
over fifty countries. Examples of terrorist acts committed before 9/11 are
those that occurred in Algeria, killing thousands of people, and those in
Kenya, and Tanzania, Beirut, Israel, and Mumbai.9 Furthermore, in 2005
and 2006 respectively, Australian, and Canadian security agencies
thwarted plans to assassinate members of government, parliament, and
the destruction of important buildings, such as government buildings,
parliaments, the stock exchange, broadcasting buildings, and the opera
house. Terrorists were also planning to behead the Prime Minster of
Canada (in 2006).
The results of several research projects demonstrate the prevalence of
Middle Eastern extreme ideologies among some Muslims around the
world. For example, in an opinion poll of one thousand US Muslims
conducted in 2007, eight percent believed that suicide attacks on civilian
targets are sometimes or often justified in order to defend their religion.10
Another survey conducted in 2006 involving Muslims in Britain, France,
Germany, and Spain indicated that 7 to 16 percent of participants felt that
suicide attacks are sometimes or often justified.11 In addition, 5 percent of
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US Muslims were favorable towards al-Qaida, and 8 percent justified
suicide attacks. This translates to 70,000 adult US Muslims with
radicalized opinions in relation to the war on terrorism.12
In addition, British Muslims who reported their primary identity as being
Muslim held more positive views towards jihad, and martyrdom than their
fellow Muslim citizens who reported their dominant identity as British.13
Likewise, 13 percent of British Muslims believe the persons who bombed
the London subway system in July 2005 were martyrs for Islam, and 49
percent believe US military actions in Iraq are an attack against Islam.14
Recently, Chiaramonte reported two studies which found that the deadly
toll of terrorism around the globe has jumped nearly 800 percent in the
past five years; An average of nearly 30,000 people per year have been
killed by terrorists between 2010 and the end of 2015.15 Chiaramonte also
reported an article that indicated that
“While the Islamic State is responsible for at least 10,780 deaths since
2013, the rise of other extremist groups like Boko Haram, and Al
Shabbab in Africa has accounted for tens of thousands of terror deaths
in the past five years.”16
Similarly, Kassam reported findings from seven different surveys results.17
These findings are summarized as followed. The first, an ICM poll from
2006 indicated that 20 percent of British Muslims sympathized with the
7/7/2005 London bombers who participated in the killing of 52 and
injuring hundreds, and thirty-one percent of younger British Muslims
endorsed or excused these bombings. According to NOP Research there
are roughly three quarters of a million terror-sympathizing people in the
UK. Twenty-seven percent of those polled in the United Kingdom say they
had sympathy with the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, with 78 percent
supporting punishment for the publication of cartoons featuring
Muhammed, and 68 percent supporting the arrest and prosecution of
British people who “insult Islam.” The second, according to World Public
Opinion conducted in 2009 at the University of Maryland, states that 61
percent of Egyptians, 32 percent of Indonesians, 41 percent of Pakistanis,
38 percent of Moroccans, 83 percent of Palestinians, 62 percent of
Jordanians, and 42 percent of Turks appear to endorse or sympathize with
attacks on Americans. The third, a 2013 study, found that 16 percent of
young Muslims in Belgium believed that state terrorism is "acceptable,"
while 12 percent of young Muslims in Britain said that there were ways to
justify suicide attacks against civilians in Britain. The fourth, Pew
Research from 2007, found that 26 percent of young Muslims in America
believed suicide bombings are justified, with 35 percent in Britain, 42
percent in France, 22 percent in Germany, and 29 percent in Spain feeling
the same. The fifth survey proves Muslims who are more devout or
dedicated to Islam are three times more likely to believe that suicide
bombings are justified. The sixth finding shows that while just five percent
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of UK Muslims said they would not report a terror attack being planned,
the number increased to 18 percent amongst young British Muslims. The
seventh finding, from the BBC, found that 36 percent of 16- to 24-year old
Muslims believe that if a Muslim converts to another religion they deserve
punishment by death.
Another research survey on a sample of Canadian Muslims from Ottawa
indicated that 19percent approve of the Muslim Brotherhood organization,
and 9percent agree that all governments would be better if they were ruled
under the Caliphate.18 Also, Rusin reported that Muslims in Canada
indicated their support for punishing people who deserted Islam.19
Consistent with these research findings, Canadian research indicates the
prevalence of Middle Eastern extremist ideologies among samples from
western, and nonwestern countries.20 Consistent with these findings,
Fatah reported that the problem of radicalization is widely entrenched,
and embedded among Somali, Bangladeshi, and Pakistani Canadians.
Unfortunately, the prevalence of these ideologies may have contributed to
the home-grown terrorism that we have seen of late on members of the
RCMP and parliament.21
A possible way to reduce the growth of extreme ideologies and their
subsequent terrorist actions is to explore the potential of threats that the
followers of different religions may show in their attitudes toward
extremism. To this end, the Assessment and Treatment of Radicalization
Scale (ATRS) was designed to measure Middle Eastern attitudes, beliefs,
and ideologies supportive of extremists/terrorists practice.22 The findings
from different research locations confirm the reliability and validity of
ATRS scale to measure Middle Eastern extremism. Several studies, where
the ATRS was utilized were conducted by different scholars from different
countries (Australia, Canada, Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, and South African).23
The majority of these scholars were university affiliated in the fields of
psychiatry or psychology. Participants were from different religious
backgrounds. The first international study had participants from Australia,
Canada, Egypt, and south Africa.24 The findings have indicated that
Muslims scored significantly higher than other religious groups, regardless
of their country of origin or where they are living. Another study
administered the ATRS among new Pakistani immigrants to Canada.25 The
results indicated a significant difference between the responses of
Muslims, and Christians, with Muslims scoring higher than the Christians
do. Similarly, another study administered the ATRS to Nigerian
participants.26 Results indicated that the prevalence of Middle Eastern
extremist ideologies among Nigerian Muslims is significantly higher than
that of Nigerian Christians.
In a more recent study Karimi, Loza, and Loza investigated the prevalence
of extreme Middle Eastern ideologies among some Iranians.27 The results
of this study confirmed the higher prevalence of extreme Middle Eastern
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beliefs among Iranian Muslims than non-believers. The goal of the current
article was to investigate the prevalence of the extreme Middle Eastern
ideologies among a sample of Iranian participants.
The authors here compared the responses of a sample of Iranian Muslim
with previously collected samples of Atheists, Christians, and Muslims
from some other parts of the world. It was hypothesized that Iranian
Muslims will score significantly higher than samples of Christians, and
Atheists around the world, but not significantly different from samples of
Muslims from other countries.

Methods
Participants
Involved in this study were Iranian Muslims, and Atheists as well as
Christians, and Muslims from other parts of the world Table 1 indicates
the demographic characteristics of the participants. The Iranian
participants were all from Tehran, and resided in Iran at the time of data
collection. The participants from other parts of the world were nonIranians. The participants were selected using convenience rather than
random sampling. Thus, participants who agreed to participate in this
study were included regardless of their demographic backgrounds.
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Participants
Demographics

Muslims of
Iran (n=138)
Frequency (%)

Christians of
parts of the world
(n=443)
Frequency (%)

Non Iranian
Muslims (n=294)
Frequency (%)

Atheists: Iran &
other parts the
world (n=200)
Frequency (%)

Age M(SD)

33.09 (10.15)

35.21 (11.77)

29.04 (11.03)

35.62 (10.63)

M

51.45

45.43

50.68

49.24

F

48.55

54.57

49.32

50.76

< Secondary

5.11

5.71

11.68

-

Secondary

20.44

12.33

11

16.84

College

-

36.76

30.24

30.1

University

51.09

30.82

38.83

19.9

Grad

23.36

14.38

8.25

33.16

-

6.73

-

2.51

Sex

Education

Occupation
Police Officer
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Student

16.3

21.63

48.85

12.06

Social Work

-

20.91

2.69

21.61

Youth Works

-

4.09

0.38

5.03

Unemployed

7.41

11.06

41.92

16.58

Teacher

31.85

4.57

0.77

7.54

Professional
Job

23.7

24.76

5

30.65

SelfEmployment

10.37

2.64

0.38

2.01

Unprofessional

10.37

3.61

-

2.01

Source: Authors.
Measures
The ATRS consists of six subscales, with each subscale designed to tap into
a prominent ideological theme. The first subscale (4 items) reflects
negative Attitudes toward Israel. Many extremists considered the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict as one of the central sources of grievance promotion.28
The following is an example of this subscale: “The solution to the Middle
East problems is to eradicate Israel.” The second subscale (five items) is
Political Views, which measures the important political views that are
advocated by Middle Eastern extremists (for example opposing secular
laws and governments, and advocating for the implementation of the
Sharia [Islamic] law).29 An example of this subscale is “The laws that are
made by man should be replaced by God’s mandated laws.” The third
subscale (5 items) assesses participants’ Attitudes toward Women. These
current, extreme attitudes are mainly repressive, were generally foreign to
most Middle Eastern countries, and were not promoted prior to the
1970s.30 The following is an example of this subscale: “Women should
always have a male companion from her immediate family when they are
traveling.” The fourth subscale (5 items) measures negative Attitudes
towards Western Culture. Middle Eastern extremists have been vocal in
their rejection of Western culture.31 They claim that Western civilization is
corrupt and that the West is trying to undermine their religion.32
Extremists generally emphasize the prevalence of negative attitudes in the
Muslim countries toward non-Muslim cultures.33 An example for this
subscale is “Because of its values, it is hard for believers to integrate in a
Western culture.” The fifth subscale (6 items), Religiosity, assesses the
respondents’ commitment to their religion. Extremists use religion to
advocate for their cause and to recruit new pools of extremists.34 Some
questions in this subscale tap into extreme religious views that are
common in the Middle East. An example of this subscale is “Our loyalty
should be more to our religion than to the country flags or citizenship.”
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The sixth subscale (8 items), Condoning Fighting, measures views that
condone fighting, and promote acts of violence as a means for the revival
of religion with the goal of destroying infidels, (for example atheists, and
nonbelievers in Islam) and achieving one world under the Islamic
religion.35 An example of this subscale is “I support fighting against the
nonbelievers of God.” A final, seventh, subscale is a validity scale that
indicates whether participants misunderstood the items, answered
carelessly, or deliberately attempted to conceal their true answers. Items
included in this subscale are additional to the 33 items of the ATRS. The
total score consists of the answers to the items included in the first six
subscales (items included in the validity subscale are not included in the
total scale score). The ATRS underwent four stages of development that
have been described in detail in previous articles.36
Procedure
Iranian participants were Muslims. The authors asked them if they were
willing to participate in this research project, and fill out a questionnaire
(the ATRS) about their beliefs. The participants were workers, casual
workers, students, and individuals’ university courses, seminars, or
upgrading workshops.
The authors assured the participants about the confidentiality of their
responses. They also informed them that they could decline their
participation at any time. Approximately 10 percent declined to
participate. The authors compared the responses of Muslims of Iran with
data previously collected from Atheists, Christians, and Muslims from
other countries.

Results
We conducted a t-test to compare ATRS among Iran’s Muslim, Christians
from other parts of the world, and Atheists from other parts the world.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the results.
Table 2: Comparing Muslims of Iran vs. Christians from Other
Parts of the World in ATRS
Muslims of Iran
(n=138)

Christians (n=443)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Attitude Towards Israel

1.14 (1.33)

0.76 (1.14)

3.32**

Political Views

2.63(1.59)

1.90(2.11)

3.75***

Attitude Towards
Women

1.62(1.22)

1.00(1.71)

3.98***

Subscales

t value
(df=579)
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Attitude Toward
Western Culture

2.33(1.58)

1.60(1.75)

4.37***

Fighting

4.04(1.99)

2.66(2.98)

5.08***

Religiosity

3.37(1.94)

2.87(2.69)

2.03*

Total ATRS

15.13(7.57)

10.78(10.83)

4.39***

Source: Authors.

df= Degrees of Freedom
* P< .05,
** P< .001,

*** P< .0001

The results in Table 2 indicates that there were significant differences in
the total, and subscale scores of the ARTS between Iranian Muslims, and
the Christian of some parts of the world on the total scale, and subscales
scores.
Table 3: Comparing Muslims of Iran vs. Muslims from Other
Parts of the World in ATRS
Muslims of Iran
(n=138)

Non Iranian
Muslims (n=294)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Attitude Towards
Israel

1.14 (1.33)

3.27 (2.11)

10.83**

Political Views

2.63(1.59)

5.99(3.59)

10.50**

Attitude Towards
Women

1.62(1.22)

5.22(4.58)

9.06**

Attitude Toward
Western Culture

2.33(1.58)

5.70(4.14)

9.27**

Fighting

4.04(1.99)

9.48(7.73)

8.14**

Religiosity

3.37(1.94)

8.66(1.94)

10.51**

Total ATRS

15.13(7.57)

38.30(26.98)

9.90**

Subscales

t value
(df=430)

Source: Authors.

** P< .0001
The results in Table 3 indicate that there were significant differences in
total, and subscales of ATRS scores between Muslims from other parts of
the world, and Iranian Muslims with non-Iranian Muslims scoring
significantly higher than Iranian Muslims from. The total ATRS subscale
designed to tap into extremists’ prominent ideological theme. Thus,
according to the current results the Iranian Muslims hold less extreme
religion views than non-Iranian Muslims.
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Table 4: Comparing Muslims of Iran vs. Atheists from Other
Parts of the World in ATRS
Muslims of Iran
(n=138)

Atheists (n=200)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Attitude Towards
Israel

1.14 (1.33)

0.34 (0.85)

6.77**

Political Views

2.63(1.59)

0.55(1.06)

14.42**

Attitude Towards
Women

1.62(1.22)

0.42(0.84)

10.73**

Attitude Toward
Western Culture

2.33(1.58)

1.09(1.24)

8.01**

Fighting

4.04(1.99)

1.22(1.68)

14.02**

Religiosity

3.37(1.94)

0.76(1.38)

14.46**

Total ATRS

15.13(7.57)

4.37(5.38)

15.26**

Subscales

t value
(df=336)

Source: Authors.

** P< .0001
Table 4 demonstrates that Iranian Muslims had higher scores on the total,
and subscales score of the ATRS (M=15.13, SD = 7.57) than those Atheists
from other parts of the World.

Discussion
Consistent with previous results, the current results indicated that scores
of total ATRS, and its subscales among Iranian Muslims were significantly
higher than Christians of some parts of the world. Iranian Muslims also,
had higher scores than Iranian Atheists, and Atheists from other parts of
the world. New finding from this research indicates that the scores of the
total ATRS, and its subscale for Muslims of Iran were significantly less
than Muslims from other parts of the world.
The prevalence of the extreme Middle Eastern ideologies among Iranian
Muslims was demonstrated by the finding that participants of the Muslim
faith scored significantly higher on the ATRS than their Christian, and
Atheists counterparts. Unexpectedly, however, was the finding that
Iranian Muslims scored significantly less than the Muslims from other
parts of the world. It is our opinion that the following explains this finding
best. First, although the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution led to the
overthrow of the Pahlavi regime, and the governance of Islamic regime,
the idealistic promises of the Islamist spectrum have not yet been realized,
including themes such as establishing a justice system, and reduction of
class contradictions. Today it seems that the Iranian government is
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witnessing the resistance of many people, especially the youth, against the
government-supported Islamic identity.
Second, the majority of Iranian Muslims are Shia while the majority of
Islamic fundamentalism emerged from Sunni populations utilizing
extreme ideologies prevalent in Muslim societies in the Middle East. One
can claim that the Muslim Sunni world was subjected to more colonial
influence that the Shia Muslims in Iran.
Third, unlike the Arab and Sunni living in other parts of the world—mostly
under secular governments—Iran has lived with an Islamic government
since 1979. Suffering for decades from the oppressive rule of Republic
Islamic, Iranian Shia seems to be more skeptical about political Islam.
Moreover, quite contrary to fundamental Sunnis who have constructed the
Christianity as it’s ‘‘Other,’’ the fundamental Shias’ “Other” appears to be
Sunni Muslim. Its dynamic is related more to Sunni Muslim rather than
Western Christianity. Thus, while the increase of the influence, and
presence of Western powers in the Middle East provokes fundamental
Sunnis, it has not influenced Shias as powerfully, and remain almost
indifferent to Western pressures.
Fourth, the majority of Iranian society are followers of Shia, and they are
much more open to Sufism school than those who have accepted the
tenant of the Sunni religion. These followers of Sufism partly are against
fundamentalist orientations.37 Sufism is not accepted by Islamic
fundamentalism.38 Fifth, the majority of Sunni minorities (about 15
percent of Iran's population) are Kurds, whose priority is not Islam.
Rather, they mostly adhere to their Kurdish nationality. This ethnic
nationalism of Kurds is more consistent with secular narratives.
Beside the above reported findings, the present article lends further
support for the value of using the ARTS to assess Muslim extremists. As
reported in previous reports, ATRS has several advantages. First, because
the ATRS is a self-report scale, it ensures maximal objectivity by avoiding
possible misinterpretation of participants’ responses, and reduces the
possibility of assessor biases, which is important in this sensitive area of
assessment.
Second, the ATRS is more convenient and economical to use than lengthy
interviews. Participants simply provide numeric responses indicating
agreement or disagreement with the items, with the scale usually taking
only a few minutes to complete. Scoring the test is straightforward, as the
basic interpretation requires minimal professional time. A third advantage
of the ATRS is the large proportion of dynamic statements that we can use
to measure the effect of any changes over time or after any intervention. A
fourth advantage is that we can subsequently use individuals’ responses as
part of an individualized intervention plan. For example, extreme
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erroneous thoughts indicated by the endorsement of particular statements
could be challenged during treatment. Finally, the ATRS has other
practical uses such as in joint administration with other methods used for
screening and identifying applicants with extreme Middle Eastern
views.3939
The current article has the following limitations: First, participants were
selected using convenience rather than randomized sampling, and
collateral important data about the participants. Second, it is impossible to
further assess concurrent validity of the ATRS due to the lack of other
available assessment measures. To our knowledge, the ARTS is the first,
and only measure designed to measure quantitatively extremist Middle
East ideology. Thus, there is a need to further research the concurrent
validity of ATRS. Third, the use of the current data for future predictive
studies is not possible because of the difficulties in accessing participants
who committed terrorist acts.

Conclusion
The goal of the present article was to investigate the prevalence of the
extreme Middle Eastern ideologies among Iranians. To achieve this goal,
the Assessment and Treatment of Radicalization Scale (ATRS) was
utilized, designed to measure quantitatively Middle Eastern extremist
ideologies. Data collected from Iranian participants was compared to data
previously collected from other parts of the world that included Atheists,
Christians, and Muslims. As hypothesized, the Iranian Muslims scored
significantly higher than samples of Christians, and Atheists around the
world, but not significantly different from samples of Muslims from other
countries. The results of the present article add some support to the
previous studies regarding the utilization of the ATRS as a tool for
measuring the prevalence of Middle Eastern extremist ideologies among
Muslim populations. Future research utilizing the ATRS on different
countries that have Muslim majorities, or even countries that have
minority Muslim populations, may add to our understanding of the
prevalence of the extreme Middle Eastern ideologies around the world.
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